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This study seeks to contribute to the existing business strategy and the environment
literature by examining the effect of governance structures on Chinese firms' envi-
ronmental performance, and consequently ascertain the extent to which the financial
performance–environmental performance nexus is moderated by governance mecha-
nisms. Using a sample of Chinese companies from heavily polluting industries over a
5-year period, our baseline findings suggest that, on average, board size and
governing board meetings are positively associated with Chinese firms' environmen-
tal performance, whilst board independence and gender diversity have positive, but
insignificant association with firms' environmental performance. Our evidence sug-
gests further that the examined internal governance mechanisms have a mixed mod-
erating effect on the link between financial performance and environmental
performance. Our findings have important implications for company executives, envi-
ronmental activists, policy-makers, and regulators. Our results support insights drawn
from agency, resource dependence, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
China has become the second-largest economy in the world, behind
the United States, and this has mainly been achieved through signifi-
cant manufacturing and production of goods/services (McGuinness,
Vieito, & Wang, 2017; Shahab, Ntim, & Ullah, 2019). However, such
remarkable economic growth has, arguably, led to greater environ-
mental and public health damages (Elmagrhi, Ntim, Elamer, &
Zhang, 2019). For example, China is currently the world's largest con-
sumer of energy, accounting for 23% of the total global energy con-
sumption (Lin & Kuang, 2020). Further, and according to a report
published by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2019),
China is the largest producer and consumer of coal. For example, the
EIA (2019) indicated that China accounted for more than 60% of
global total industrial coal consumption in 2018. China is also consid-
ered as the largest contributor of carbon dioxide globally. A study con-
ducted by researchers from Chinese University of Hong Kong
indicates that air pollution emissions were estimated to cause approxi-
mately 1.1 million death and a cost of 267 billion yuan (i.e., about US
$42 billion) (Kao, 2018). In response to these serious environmental,
economic and social threats, the Chinese government and regulatory
authorities (i.e., Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, and
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges) have pursued a
number of positive initiatives, including introducing various laws and
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guidelines that have been aimed at promoting the implementation of
good environmental practices (i.e., Environmental Protection Law and
Paris Agreement on Climate Change). However, and despite these dif-
ferent environmental reforms and measures, the lack of enforcement
of laws and regulations in China has led to poor implementation of
such environmental acts and guidelines (Yee, Tang, & Lo, 2016). To
promote the implementation of sustainable strategies and, thus, the
adoption of environmental friendly activities, it has been suggested
that corporations need to strengthen their internal governance struc-
tures (De Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011; García-Martín &
Herrero, 2020), by, for example, increasing board gender diversity and
independence, having appropriate board size, and instituting frequent
board meetings. However, and despite the importance of internal
governance structures in enhancing commitment to environmentally
friendly activities (Nguyen, Ntim, & Malagila, 2020; Ntim &
Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), there is a lack of empirical research
examining the impact of board structure variables on environmental
performance among Chinese corporations, and this offers a great
opportunity to make original contributions to the existing literature.
Therefore, this study seeks to examine the impact of internal gover-
nance structures on the environmental performance of a sample of
Chinese firms from heavily polluting industries (i.e., coal, metallurgy,
mining and steel industries).
Theoretically, corporations may voluntarily commit to environ-
mental friendly activities due to two main reasons: (i) to obtain com-
petitive advantages, including accessing crucial resources (Allegrini &
Greco, 2013; De Villiers et al., 2011; Haque & Ntim, 2020) and/or
(ii) to legitimise their operations by obtaining the approval of the
wider community (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016; Cong & Freedman, 2011;
Ntim, 2016). Specifically, agency and resource dependence theories
focus on the financial benefits and competitive advantages that can
be obtained from adopting good governance structures, whereas
legitimacy and stakeholder theories are predominately concerned with
improving corporate reputation and image by adopting strong gover-
nance structures. First, agency theory suggests that good governance
structures, in the form of having large, diverse and independent
boards and regular meetings, can enhance managerial monitoring and
improve board independence by bringing diverse views, ideas, per-
spectives and skills into corporate boards' decision-making thought
process (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Nelson, Gallery, & Percy, 2010),
and this in turn can improve corporate environmental perfor-
mance. Similarly, resource dependence theory (Hillman, Cannella, &
Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) indicates that good gover-
nance, which is often associated with larger, independent and diverse
boards, as well as frequent board meetings, can improve corporate
reputation and image by providing better connections with powerful
stakeholders in order to gain access to crucial resources. Therefore,
and based on agency and resource dependence theories, good gover-
nance structures can increase pressure on corporations to commit to
environmentally friendly activities in order to meet the expectations
of their principals and secure access to the strategic resources. On the
other hand, legitimacy theory (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Liao, Luo, &
Tang, 2015; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013) suggests that having large,
diverse and independent boards with frequent board meetings can
increase pressure on corporations to comply with good practices in
order not only to obtain competitive advantages but also to meet the
values/expectations of the broader community and legitimise their
activities. Finally, stakeholder theory predicts that demonstrating
greater accountability and transparency via increased commitment to
good environmental practices can help in improving corporate reputa-
tion/image by balancing the conflicting demands of various stake-
holders (Dixon, Milton, & Woodhead, 2005; Welford, 2007).
Therefore, legitimacy and stakeholder theories suggest that good gov-
ernance structures are effective in protecting the interests of multiple
stakeholders, and this can impact positively on corporate environmen-
tal performance.
Empirically, studies examining issues relating to environmental
performance and its determinants are not only limited (Elmagrhi
et al., 2019; Orazalin, 2020; Tran, Beddewela, & Ntim, 2020) but also
suffer from a number of weaknesses. First, despite the importance of
good governance practices and increasing suggestions that top man-
agement structures can significantly influence corporate strategic
decisions, including those relating to engaging in environmentally
friendly activities (Shahab et al., 2020), existing studies have focused
largely on examining the effect of board structure variables on
(i) governance disclosures (Elmagrhi, Ntim, & Wang, 2016; Ntim,
Soobaroyen, & Broad, 2017), (ii) corporate social responsibility (Liao,
Lin, & Zhang, 2018; McGuinness et al., 2017) and (iii) corporate per-
formance (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Jackling & Johl, 2009).
Second, studies investigating whether and how board structure vari-
ables can influence corporate environmental performance are scarce
(De Villiers et al., 2011; Elmagrhi et al., 2019; García-Martín &
Herrero, 2020; Rupley, Brown, & Marshall, 2012), which limit current
knowledge relating to the influence of board structures on firms' envi-
ronmental performance. Third, these few environmental performance
studies are impaired in that they have largely been conducted in the
context of developed countries, such as Australia (Rao, Tilt, &
Lester, 2012), United States (De Villiers et al., 2011; Post, Rahman,
& McQuillen, 2015; Rupley et al., 2012), EU (García-Martín &
Herrero, 2020), Japan (Aslam, Elmagrhi, Rehman, & Ntim, 2020) and
United Kingdom (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Liao et al., 2015),
with relatively less attention being paid to environmental performance
in the context of developing/emerging economies in general
(Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 2018; Haladu & Salim, 2016;
Iatridis, 2013) and in China in particular, where environmental prob-
lems (i.e., land degradation, air and water pollution and deforestation)
have posed significant threat to public lives and health (Elmagrhi
et al., 2019; Shahab et al., 2020). Fourth, prior studies have examined
the impact of a small number of board structure variables, such as
board gender diversity (Ben-Amar, Chang, & McIlkenny, 2017;
Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015) and board independence (Brammer
& Pavelin, 2008) on firms' environmental performance. In contrast, it
seems that there is a lack of empirical studies investigating the effect
of various board structure variables on environmental performance.
Fifth, past empirical studies have measured firms' environmental per-
formance in China by using either Rakins' database (Liao et al., 2018;
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Shahab et al., 2020) or dummy variables (Jia & Zhang, 2011). How-
ever, such measures may not accurately capture companies' actual
environmental performance (Elmagrhi et al., 2019), which raises doubt
about the generalisability of the findings of these studies. As such, a
content analysis technique has been used in this study to measure
both the depth and scale of environmental performance among
Chinese firms operating in heavily polluting industries. Therefore,
these weaknesses, together, have motivated us to empirically examine
the impact of various board structure variables on the environmental
performance among a sample of Chinese listed companies from
heavily polluting industries.1
Given the noticeable limitations of past environmental perfor-
mance studies, our study seeks to broaden current knowledge and
contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, and
unlike much of the prior studies that have mainly been conducted in
the context of developed economies, our study advances the current
knowledge by providing new evidence on governance structures and
environmental performance in a country characterised by excessive
industrial pollution and emissions and poor implementation of envi-
ronmental laws and regulations (Chang, Li, & Lu, 2015). Second, this
study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on
the effect of board structure variables on environmental performance.
More importantly, our research examines the impact of several board
structure variables that have not widely been examined in past studies
(i.e., board size, board gender diversity, board independence and fre-
quency of board meetings) on the implementation of good environ-
mental practices. Third, and distinct from past Chinese studies that
included different industries in their analysis (Jia & Zhang, 2011; Liao
et al., 2018; Shahab et al., 2020), our study contributes to the extant
literature by focusing mainly on firms from China's heavily polluting
industries that cause serious environmental and public health threats,
and this, arguably, may help in reducing any sample selection bias that
exists in past studies (Chang et al., 2015). Finally, and to improve the
generalisability of the findings of past Chinese studies, this study
employs content analysis method to develop a comprehensive envi-
ronmental performance measure, covering eight dimensions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second
section discusses the Chinese governance code and environmental
policy in China. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. The fol-
lowing sections review empirical literature and hypotheses develop-
ment, present the research design and report the findings and
discussion. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 | ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
China has achieved rapid economic transformation and development
over the past several years (i.e., China's annual growth GDP per capita
is about 10%) (Worldbank, 2019) and became the world's largest
manufacturing economy and exporter of goods (Shahab, Ntim,
Chengang, Ullah, & Fosu, 2018; Shahab et al., 2019). China has not
only become the world's largest manufacturing and exporting country,
but it is also expected to become the world's most powerful economy
in the coming few years (Du, Jian, Zeng, & Du, 2014). However, such
remarkable economic growth has, arguably, led to greater environ-
mental and public health damages (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). This is
mainly due to fact that, in the past, the Chinese government primarily
focused on boosting manufacturing and exports by not monitoring
closely the massive use of environmentally harmful natural resources
(e.g., coal, fossil fuel) by Chinese companies. This resulted in making
China the world's most polluted country due to high carbon dioxide
emissions. For example, China is one of the countries with the highest
consumption of fossil energy, with coal accounting for about 70% of
total energy consumption (He, 2015; Jiao, Li, & Bai, 2018;
Worldbank, 2007). Further, and according to a study conducted by
researchers from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, air pollution is
one of the worst environmental issues in China and it causes around
1.1 million death and destroys above 20 million tons of crop produc-
tion (e.g., rice and wheat) (Kao, 2018).
Due to these environmental, economic and social threats, the
Chinese government and regulatory authorities have undertaken a
number of positive initiatives by introducing various laws and guide-
lines that are aimed at promoting the implementation of good envi-
ronmental practices. For example, the Chinese government imposed
the first trial version of Environmental Protection in 1979 and the first
official version of the same law in 1989 (Chang et al., 2015). In addi-
tion, the Chinese government issued a new updated version of Envi-
ronmental Protection Law in 2014 with the aim of improving
environmental governance and performance among Chinese compa-
nies (Shahab et al., 2019). Further, and since 1 May 2008, the Ministry
of Environmental Protection of China (formerly known as the State
Environmental Protection Administration) imposed the Regulation on
Environmental Information Disclosure, which required both heavy-
polluting companies and environmental agencies to publish environ-
mental information to the general public (Du et al., 2014). The stock
exchanges in China have also published guidelines on environmental
disclosure for listed companies (Weber, 2014). Specifically, Shanghai,
Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock exchanges have introduced various
environmental protection disclosure guidelines in 2007, 2008 and
2013, requiring Chinese listed companies to publish environmental
and social reports to the general public.
However, and despite these different environmental reforms and
measures, the lack of enforcement of laws and regulations in China
has led to poor implementation of such environmental acts and codes
(Khan & Chang, 2018). Further, and despite the fact that Chinese
1We focus in this study on firms from heavily polluting industries (i.e., coal, metallurgy,
mining and steel industries) due to the following reasons. First, they are the largest
consumers of coal in China, since coal represents about 70% of their total energy
consumption (He, 2015). Second, Chinese companies from heavily polluting industries
account for 8.6% of the total global emissions (Goldenberg, 2013). Third, such emissions
produced by Chinese firms from heavily polluting industries can cause serious health and
environmental problems (Kao, 2018). Finally, and despite the sustained and extensive
governance and environmental reforms in China (i.e., Corporate Governance Codes,
Environmental Protection Law, and Paris Agreement on Climate Change) that have aimed at
improving firms' environmental accountability and performance (Shahab et al., 2019;
Weber, 2014), environmental management, performance and sustainability still suffer from
major weaknesses in China (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). These reasons, together, serve as strong
motivation for us to focus on Chinese firms from heavily polluting industries.
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companies are required to produce separate environmental perfor-
mance reports, the narrative and/or format of those reports are not
clearly specified, and thus, environmental reporting quality can be
influenced by the governing board's preferences (Jizi, 2017). There-
fore, we argue that strengthening internal corporate governance
structures, in the form of having large, independent and diverse
boards, and frequent board meetings, can help in improving the
implementations of environmental laws and guidelines. As will be
explained further in the following section, prior studies (Alhossini,
Ntim, & Zalata, 2021; Harjoto et al., 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
McGuinness et al., 2017) suggest that establishing strong board struc-
tures can increase pressure on corporations to demonstrate greater
accountability to the general public by engaging in good corporate
practices, including those relating to pursing environmentally respon-
sible strategies. This study, therefore, seeks to examine the extent to
which board structure variables (i.e., board size, independence, gender
diversity and frequency of meetings) can explain differences in envi-
ronmental management practices among Chinese firms from heavily
polluting industries.
3 | THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is based on the view that
agents (directors) often act in an opportunistic manner and their
actions are mainly driven by their self-interests (e.g., wealth
maximisation). In this regard, establishing effective monitoring mecha-
nisms can help in mitigating the free rider problem by scrutinising
management activities (Cormier & Magnan, 2003). For instance,
appointing efficient corporate boards (e.g., appropriate board size,
gender diversity, independence and meeting) can play an important
role in alleviating such agency problems by monitoring executive man-
agers' decisions and actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This in turn could
lead to a better strategic decision making, and greater transparency
and disclosure practices that can lessen the extent of information
asymmetry between the related parties (Jensen, 1993; Samaha,
Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012), and therefore positively
affect corporate environmental performance. Similarly, resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) indicates that having
effective boards can help not only in mitigating agency problems but
also in lowering firms' uncertainty and risks by establishing better
business networks with powerful stakeholders. In this perspective,
resource dependence theory implies that effective board structures
can increase pressure on firms to implement good environmental
polices/strategies in order to obtain the support of powerful stake-
holders and thereby gain access to important resources (De Villiers
et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2000). Although agency and resource
dependence theories highlight the importance of having strong gover-
nance structures in enhancing corporate environmental responsibili-
ties and performance, these theories are impaired in that they
primarily focus on the financial benefits and competitive advantages
of environmental performance (Haque, 2017). However, firms
may also commit to good environmental performance practices in
order to improve their image and demonstrate compliance with
norms/values of the larger community (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008;
Dixon et al., 2005).
Accordingly, this study also employs legitimacy and stakeholder
theories to explain the impact of board structure variables on
firms' environmental performance. Legitimacy theory (Cong &
Freedman, 2011) indicates that corporations commit to good environ-
mental practices not only to meet the expectations of their principals
but also to conform to the norms/values of the larger community.
Further, legitimacy theory (Liao et al., 2015) suggests that committing
to greater environmental accountability can improve corporate legiti-
macy and image through developing and maintaining good business
connections with the external environment. In this context, firms with
good governance structures are expected to have better environmen-
tal performance in order to demonstrate accountability to the wider
community, as well as develop/maintain good relations with powerful
stakeholders. Similarly, stakeholder theory (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016;
Haque, 2017; Welford, 2007) indicates that good governance struc-
tures can help in addressing the conflicting interests of various groups
of stakeholders, by maintaining a fair balance between the financial
and nonfinancial objectives of firms. In this regard, firms may adopt
good governance practices and engage in environmentally friendly
activities in order to satisfy and balance the interests of various stake-
holder groups. However, and despite the usefulness of both legiti-
macy and stakeholder theories in explaining the impact of internal
governance structures on firms' environmental performance, these
theories are predominately concerned with the nonfinancial benefits
of environmental performance (Haque & Ntim, 2018).
The above theoretical discussions clearly illustrate that none of
these theories can provide full explanation of the impact of gover-
nance structures on environmental performance alone. Therefore, we
integrate agency, resource dependence, legitimacy and stakeholder
theories to present more comprehensive and better understanding of
the association between board structure variables and firms' environ-
mental performance.
4 | EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we develop hypotheses based on prior studies that
examine the impact of board structure variables (i.e., board size, inde-
pendence, gender diversity and frequency of meeting) on firms' envi-
ronmental performance and consequently ascertain whether these
variables have a moderating effect on the link between financial per-
formance and environmental performance.
4.1 | Board size and environmental performance
Board size is suggested to be an important mechanism that influences
board efficiency and effectiveness (Halme & Huse, 1997; Said,
Hj Zainuddin, & Haron, 2009). From legitimacy and stakeholder
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theoretical perspectives (Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001; Prado-
Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010), larger boards are more effective in
monitoring and controlling managerial opportunistic actions, since
they are often characterised by greater diversity in skills, expertise,
knowledge and representation of stakeholders. Similarly, resource
dependence theory (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994) indicates
that the greater stakeholder diversity, which is often associated with
larger boards, can place increased pressure on firms to commit to
environmentally friendly activities, in order to develop and/or main-
tain better connections with the influential stakeholders and access
the crucial resources. By contrast, agency theory (Eisenberg,
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996) indicates that larger boards
often suffer from poor decision-making, and this is mainly due to the
lack of coordination and communication among board members, and
this in turn can reduce board efficiency in monitoring managerial
opportunistic actions. Therefore, agency theory predicts that weak
governance is tightly associated with larger boards, and this can
impact adversely on firms' environmental performance.
The empirical studies have largely been conducted in the context
of developed countries (De Villiers et al., 2011; Post et al., 2015;
Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012), and the findings of these studies sug-
gest that corporate environmental performance is positively and sig-
nificantly influenced by board size. Observably, there is limited
evidence on the impact of board size on corporate environmental per-
formance in the context of emerging markets in general and in China
in particular (Zou, Xie, Qi, & Yang, 2019). Particularly, using a sample
of 1071 firm year observations of 362 firms in China from 2011 to
2013, Zou et al. (2019) show evidence on positive influence of board
size (a control variable) on environmental performance. This lack of
evidence serves as a motivation for us to examine the impact of board
size on firms' environmental performance. From regulatory perspec-
tive, the Chinese Company Law (Ribeiro, Hui, & Hui, 2019) recom-
mends that listed companies should have sufficient board size,
ranging between 5 and 19 members, in order for them to operate
effectively. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 1. A positive and significant association exists between
board size and environmental performance of Chinese firms from
heavily polluting industries.
4.2 | Board independence and environmental
performance
Resource dependence theory (Mallin & Michelon, 2011) suggests that
outside directors often provide firms with the necessary skills, talents,
experience and expertise, and this in turn can help in managing firms'
external dependencies by establishing better business networks with
powerful stakeholders. Similarly, stakeholder theory (Haque, 2017; Liao
et al., 2015) indicates that the greater diversity in skills, experience,
expertise and stakeholder representation, which is often associated
with independent boards, can help in addressing the conflicting inter-
ests of various groups of stakeholders, by maintaining balance between
the financial and nonfinancial objectives of firms. Further, legitimacy
theory (De Villiers et al., 2011) proposes that outside directors have
immaterial financial incentives to monitor and control managerial
opportunistic actions and demonstrate accountability to the wider
community in order to maintain and improve their reputation/image in
the labour market. Therefore, and based on legitimacy, stakeholder and
resource dependence theories, outside directors are expected to exert
greater pressure on the executive managers to implement good
environmental policies and strategies in order to demonstrate account-
ability to the larger community and gain access to crucial resources.
Finally, agency theory (De Villiers et al., 2011; Masud, Nurunnabi, &
Bae, 2018) indicates that the strong presence of outside director can
help in reducing agency conflicts by increasing monitoring on the top
management team's environmental investment, policy and strategy,
which can impact positively on firms' environmental performance.
Empirically, prior studies have largely found positive association
between board independence and environmental performance in the
context of developed (Cucari, Esposito De Falco, & Orlando, 2018;
Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Stratling, 2014; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011;
Rao et al., 2012) and developing/emerging (Fernandes, Bornia, &
Nakamura, 2019; Iatridis, 2013; Ibrahim & Hanefah, 2016) economies.
In contrast, there are other strand of studies which found either a
negative (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008) or no (Trireksani &
Djajadikerta, 2016) association between board independence and
environmental performance. For instance, Alnabsha et al. (2018)
found that outside directors in Jordan had a negative influence on
environmental disclosure because the appointment of independent
directors heavily relies on social networks instead of individuals' com-
petency. However, the main limitation of these studies is that they
measured environmental performance indirectly using either Rakins'
database or dummy which raises doubt about the generalisability of
the findings of these studies. Therefore, a content analysis has been
used in this study to measure both the depth and scale of environ-
mental performance among Chinese firms from heavily polluting
industries. Although past empirical studies found mixed results, the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (2001) and the Chinese
China Association for Public Companies (2014) issued guidelines rec-
ommending that at least one third of board members should be inde-
pendent directors. This implies that increasing the proportion of
independent directors is seen as a positive improvement that can
increase pressure on firms to implement environmentally friendly
activities. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study is that
Hypothesis 2. A positive and significant association exists between
board independence and environmental performance of Chinese
firms from heavily polluting industries.
4.3 | Board meetings and environmental
performance
Theoretically, and based on agency theory (Vafeas, 1999), the number
of board meeting is viewed as a good measure of board members'
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diligence and efforts. It is argued that frequent board meetings can
increase managerial monitoring and improve board effectiveness by
allowing board members to share ideas and critically discuss issues
impacting firms' operations (Laksmana, 2008; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).
Similarly, and from stakeholder and legitimacy theoretical perspectives
(Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2018), the increased competition, operational
complexity and uncertainty in today's business environment have
increased the need to have frequent meetings in order to address
multiple stakeholders' concerns and better evaluate firms' various
risks, including those relating to environmental challenges. Finally,
resource dependence theory (Wincent, Anokhin, & Örtqvist, 2010)
suggests that the increased representation of stakeholders' concerns,
which is often associated with frequent board meetings, can promote
corporate efficiency by developing and/or maintaining better business
networks with influential stakeholders in order to access the required
resources.
Empirically, there seems to be lack of empirical studies examin-
ing the effect of board meetings frequency on firms' environmental
performance, and this serves as a movitation for us to examine this
association. Prior studies (Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, &
Sepulveda, 2014; Giannarakis, 2014a, 2014b; Jizi et al., 2014; Liao
et al., 2018; Webb, 2004) have largerly examined the impact of
board frequency of meetings on corporate social responsibility and
disclosure and provided mixed results. For example, Jizi
et al. (2014) report a statistically positive association between
social responsibility disclosures and the frequency of board meet-
ings among US listed commercial banks. In contrast, and using a
sample of 283 firms from 25 countries, Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-
Sanchez (2010) report a negative and significant relationship
between the frequency of board meetings and greenhouse gas dis-
closures, whereas (Giannarakis, 2014a, 2014b) find no association
between board frequency of meetings and social responsibility dis-
closures among US firms. With refernce to the impact of board
frequency of meetings on environmental performance, and to the
best of our knowledge, there is only one study conducted by
Hussain et al. (2018) using 100 US listed firms and find insignifi-
cant association between the two variables of interests. Neverthe-
less, and based on the predictions of agency, legitimacy, resource
dependence and stakeholders theory, we expect a positive link
between board frequency of meetings and environmental perfor-
mance; hence, our third hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 3. A positive and significant association exists between
board frequency of meeting and environmental performance of
Chinese firms from heavily polluting industries.
4.4 | Gender diversity and environmental
performance
Board diversity is widely perceived as an important mechanism that
influence leadership efficiency/effectiveness and impact on board
decisions, including those relating to corporate environmental
responsibilities (Cucari et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2015; Robinson &
Dechant, 1997). Prior studies suggest that board diversity can be
measured using different attributes, such as gender, ethnicity, age,
nationality, religion and cultural background (Haque, 2017; Mallin &
Michelon, 2011; Post et al., 2011). However, the current study
focuses on the gender attributes of board diversity, and this is due
to the following two reasons: (i) gender diversity aspect can be
objectively observed and accurately captured (Liao et al., 2015) and
(ii) prior studies have widely focused on this aspect of board diver-
sity (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; Glass, Cook, & Ingersoll, 2016; Mallin
& Michelon, 2011; McGuinness et al., 2017; Nguyen, Ntim, &
Malagila, 2020). Theoretically, agency theory (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003) considers increasing the proportion of female direc-
tors as an important internal monitoring mechanism that restrains
managers' opportunistic behaviours, since it is often associated
with promoting board independence and effectiveness by brining
various aspects of relational and human capital into a corporate
boardroom, which can impact positively on firms' environmental
performance. Similarly, resource dependence theory (Haque, 2017)
suggests that the increased representation of multiple stakeholders'
interests, which is often associated with gender diverse boards, can
help in addressing stakeholders' environmental concerns, which can
in turn facilitate access to resources. Finally, stakeholder and legiti-
macy theories (Glass et al., 2016; Mallin & Michelon, 2011) indi-
cate that female directors are more concerned about developing
and strengthening their firms' relations with powerful stakeholders,
and hence, they are more likely to promote strategies that address
environmental challenges.
Prior empirical studies have excessively examined the extent to
which board gender diversity can influence corporate social perfor-
mance and disclosure (Boulouta, 2013; Cabeza-García, Fernández-
Gago, & Nieto, 2018; Harjoto et al., 2015; McGuinness et al., 2017;
Rao & Tilt, 2016). By contrast, studies examining whether governing
board gender diversity can influence corporate environmental respon-
sibility and disclosure are few, and the majority of these few studies
have been carried out in developed countries (Cordeiro, Profumo, &
Tutore, 2020; Cucari et al., 2018; Fernandes et al., 2019;
Galbreath, 2010; Glass et al., 2016; Lu & Herremans, 2019; Walls
et al., 2012), with the findings of these studies being mixed. However,
a study conducted by Elmagrhi et al. (2019) on the Chinese A listed
firms found that board gender diversity has a positive influence on
corporate environmental performance. In addition, the Chinese Com-
pany Law (Ribeiro et al., 2019) suggests that Chinese firms should
have gender diverse boards in order to improve board independence
and competitiveness. However, it does not clearly specify the mini-
mum number of female directors that a board should have. Thus, our
fourth hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 4. A positive and significant association exists between
board gender diversity and environmental performance of Chinese
firms from heavily polluting industries.
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4.5 | The moderating effect of governance
structure on the financial performance–environmental
performance nexus
Prior environmental and governance studies have largely focused on
examining the direct link between firm's financial performance and
environmental performance. However, these studies provided mixed
findings, including positive (Mallin, Farag, & Ow-Yong, 2014; Prado-
Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010), negative (Rao et al., 2012) or no
(Ahmad, Peter, & Nosakhare, 2015; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008;
Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016; Walls
et al., 2012) relsationship between these variables of interets. A major
limitation of these studies is that they fail to take into account the
moderating effect of governance structures on this relationship. Theo-
retically, agency theory suggests that establishing good governance
structures can strgenthen the link between firm's financial perfor-
mance and environmental performance by alignining management
interests with those of stakeholders and encourging managers to act
in stakeholders' best interests (Qiu et al., 2016). Similarly, legitimacy
and stakeholder theories indicate that commiting to good governance
practices can improve corporate legitimacy by indicating to the market
that firms' are primarily concerned with protecting multiple stake-
holders' interests (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes Ii, 2004;
Cormier & Magnan, 2003), and this can improve the link between
firm's financial performance and environmental performance. Further,
resource dependence theory proposes that strong commitment to
stakeholders' expectations, in the form of implementing good gover-
nance and environmental practices, can grant competitive advantages
to firms, including providing better business network with key stake-
holders (Russo & Fouts, 1997), and this consequently can have posi-
tive impact on firm's environmental performance and financial
performance. Empirically, and to the best of our knowledge, none of
the existing enviromental studies have examined the moderating
effect of governance structures on the financial–environmental per-
formance nexus, and this offers a great opporunity to make new con-
tribution to the extant literature. Therefore, and based on the above
theoretical arguments, our final hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 5. The link between financial performance and environmen-
tal performance is moderated by governance structures, with the
financial performance–environmental performance nexus being
stronger in Chinese firms @from heavily polluting industries with
strong governance structures.
5 | RESEARCH DESIGN
5.1 | Data and sampling
Our data sample includes both financial and nonfinancial information.
We collected financial data from the Chinese Securities Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Nonfinancial data were
gathered from annual reports or corporate social responsibility
reports, which we downloaded from Cninfo website (http://www.
cninfo.com.cn/new/index). It seems that Chinese heavily polluting
industries are the main source of pollution in China. Our sample
includes manufacturers in coal, metallurgy, mining and steel industries
because these four industries have damaging effect on environment,
namely, air and water pollution. We started collecting data in 2013
because of limited available environmental performance data before
2013. The financial year of 2017 was the last year for which data
were available at the time of collecting data. We restricted our bal-
ance final sample to firms with full data available; this resulted in
including 100 companies. Table 1 presents the total sampled compa-
nies, sample selection criteria and final sample size.
5.2 | Variables
Table 2 summarises all the main types of variables, which we used in
investigating our research hypotheses.
First, this research uses ENVIP as the main dependent variable.
Previous studies conducted in China have gathered ENVIP from
Rankins database (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; McGuinness et al., 2017;
Shahab et al., 2018) or used dummy variables (Jia & Zhang, 2011).
However, these measures raise doubts about the generalizability of
the findings of previous Chinese studies (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). There-
fore, in order to avoid above problems, we use content analysis
method approach to measure ENVIP, following well-established stud-
ies, such as Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) and Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b). We have tried our best to ensure that
ENVIP is valid and reliable measure for environmental performance by
carrying out three rounds of coding. In the first round, two indepen-
dent coders coded environmental performance for an initial sample of
10 heavily polluting companies and discussed coded items and cate-
gories. In the second round, the two coders removed any duplication
in the included items and corrected any inconsistencies in the coding
process. In the final round of coding, following recommendations of
Krippendorff (2004), a further 10 heavily polluting companies were
coded by two independent coders and a new independent coder with
experience of using content analysis and reading Chinese reports. No
inconsistencies or mistakes were identified by the three coders, which
TABLE 1 Data sample
Heavily polluting companies Total
Number of
companies
Listed companies in coal, metallurgy,
mining and steel industries
132
Exclude: 32
Companies in special treatment
process (e.g., installation of sewage
treatment plants)
15




Final sample total 100
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implied that ENVIP is valid and reliable measure for environmental
performance. Based on literature and coding process, ENVIP includes
eight dimensions, namely, clarity, environmental management, envi-
ronmental liabilities, environmental costs, environmental investments,
environmental performance, reliability and system implementation.
We assign a score to the items according to qualitative or quantitative
environmental performance reporting in annual and corporate social
responsibility reports of the sample firms. Specifically, a value of “2,”
“1,” and “0” denotes “monetary information,” “nonmonetary informa-
tion” and “no information” of environmental performance, respec-
tively. Furthermore, the highest score differs among each item due to
the difference in quantitative information. As a result, the optimal dis-
closure score is 24 (see Table 3 for additional information). Total score
divided by the optimal disclosure is a measure of ENVIP.
Second, corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are our main
independent variables. Based on the existing literature, we measure
CG mechanisms as follows: (i) board size (BSIZE) is measured by natu-
ral log of the total board members (Yermack, 1996), (ii) board indepen-
dence (BINDE) is measured using the percentage of the independent
nonexecutive directors on the board (Farag & Mallin, 2016), (iii) board
meetings (BMEET) is measured by natural log of the number of board
meetings per year (Rashid, 2018) and (iv) finally we calculate gender
diversity (GDIVE) by using the proportion of women directors to total
number of board members (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). Third, and to test
H5 (moderating effect of corporate governance on the financial
performance–environmental performance nexus), we created interac-
tion variables between corporate governance mechanisms (BSIZE,
BINDE, BMEET, GDIVE) and financial performance (FIRMP). Based on
the existing literature (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008), financial perfor-
mance is measured by net profit before taxation to total assets





ENVIP Total score/optimal disclosure
score.
Firm performance FIRMP Net profit before taxation/total
assets (ROTA).
Independent variables:
Board size BSIZE Natural log of number of directors
sitting on the board.
Board
independence
BINDE Number of independent
nonexecutive directors/number
of directors sitting on the board.
Board meeting BMEET Natural log of number of meetings
held in the year.
Gender diversity GDIVE Number of female directors/
number of directors sitting on
the board.
Control variables:
Firm size FSIZE Natural log of total assets of a
firm.
Firm leverage FLEVE Total debt/Total assets.
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(ROTA). We have used this measure due to three main reasons. First,
and unlike other corporate performance measures (e.g., ROE, ROIC),
ROTA is considered as an effective and reliable proxy for corporate
financial performance, because it “has more distributional properties,
for instance, firms' total assets are strictly positive, whereas their total
equity can be zero or even negative” (Mangena, Tauringana, &
Chamisa, 2012, p. S31). Second, ROTA has widely been used by prior
studies (Qiu et al., 2016; Haque &Ntim, 2018; De Villiers et al., 2011).
Finally, and due to data availability, we limited our financial perfor-
mance measure to ROTA.
Finally, we include firm size (FSIZE) and firm leverage (FLEVE) as
control variables in order to limit possible omitted variables bias
(Gujarati, 2009) due to two main reasons. First, and following the find-
ings of previous studies (Akbas, 2014, 2016; Giannarakis, 2014a;
Welbeck, Owusu, Bekoe, & Kusi, 2017), we expect FSIZE and FLEVE
to have significant influence on ENVIP. Second, financial data on other
variables for the heavily polluting companies, including executive pay,
was not accessible on CSMAR at the time when data collection
started, and thus, we restricted our controls to FSIZE and FLEVE.
Therefore, and consistent with prior studies (Akbas, 2014, 2016;
Giannarakis, 2014a; Maso, Basco, Bassetti, & Lattanzi, 2020; Welbeck
et al., 2017), we measure FSIZE as the natural log of total assets at the
end of fiscal year, whereas FLEVE is measured as the total debt to
total assets.
5.3 | Research model
Following a well-established line of research (Elmagrhi et al., 2019;
Shahab et al., 2018), we use ordinary least squares regression models
to investigate our hypotheses. Specifically, we estimate Equation (1)
to test our hypotheses from hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 4:
ENVIPit = β0 +
X4
k =1
βkCGit + β5FSIZEit + β6FLEVEit + εit ð1Þ
where ENVIP: the environmental performance; CG: independent vari-
ables, including 4 corporate governance measures, which are BSIZE,
BINDE, BMEET, GDIVE; FSIZE: firm size; FLEVE: firm leverage; β: the
parameters for the independent variables, firm size, and firm leverage;
t: year; i: firm; ε: error term; (Refer to Table 3 to get more details of
variables).
Furthermore, hypothesis 5 is investigated by using the following
model Equation 2:
ENVIPit = β0 +
X4
k =1




FIRMPit + β10FSIZEit + β11FLEVEit + εit ð2Þ
where FIRMP is financial performance.
6 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 4 summarizes descriptive statistics relating to ENVIP, FIRMP,
corporate governance mechanisms and control variables of 100 listed
Chinese heavily polluting companies (e.g., steel, mining, coal and
metallurgy).
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Observation Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Dependent variable
ENVIP (%) 500 0 70.83 22.83 13.3
Independent and moderating variables:
BSIZE (no.) 500 5 18 9.61 2.24
BINDE (%) 500 28.57 66.67 37.38 5.00
BMEET (no.) 500 3 24 8.72 3.363
GDIVE (%) 500 0 71.43 8.66 9.92
FIRMP (%) 500 −26.4 121.03 1.55 8.13
Control variables:
FSIZE (Yuan) 500 6700.919 238275.5 34633.37 32914.32
FLEVE (%) 500 0.78 100 52.37 22.17
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According to Table 4, ENVIP ranges from a minimum of 0% to a
maximum of 70.83% with average of 22.83%, which is less than the
findings of some studies (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; McGuinness
et al., 2017). These findings indicate that environmental performance
in high polluting industries in China is quite low and companies'
enthusiasm to disclosing environmental performance is not high.
Overall, Chinese heavily polluting firms follow Chinese CG codes. For
instance, the number of directors ranges from a minimum of 5 to a
maximum of 18, indicating that board of directors is in line with
Chinese CG codes, which require boards to have from 5 to 19 mem-
bers (Jiang & Kim, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2019). Boards have average of
nine members, which is similar to the findings of McGuinness
et al. (2017) but is less than those of Elmagrhi et al. (2019). In addition,
following the requirements of organising more than two board meet-
ings per year (Jiang & Kim, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2019), Chinese heavily
polluting companies arrange a minimum of 3 meetings and a maximum
of 24 meetings, with an average of 9 meetings. Furthermore, Chinese
heavily polluting firms appoint a minimum of two to a maximum of
eight independent directors with an average of four outsiders. Thus,
BINDE ranges a minimum of 28.57% to a maximum of 66.67% with
an average of 37.38%, which is line with CG regulations (Jiang &
Kim, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2019) and the findings of McGuinness
et al. (2017). Additionally, although CG regulations do not provide
specific requirements regarding the number or the percentage of
female directors, Chinese heavily polluting firms started evaluating
and appointing female directors (average of 1 woman director or
women directors hold 8.66% board seats), which is less than the
findings of Elmagrhi et al. (2019). It seems that corporate governance
practices in high polluting industries are extremely low (e.g., low
appointment of women directors and independent directors). As
regards to FLEVE, Chinese heavily polluting companies use average
of 52.37% of debt, which is in line with the finding of McGuinness
et al. (2017), illustrating that these firms prefer using debt to equity
capital. With reference to the other variables, including FIRMP and
FSIZE, all show wide variation, indicating that there is adequate vari-
ation in our variables.
Table 5 contains both Pearson's and Spearman's correlation
matrices for all variables used in our study in order to identify the
presence of normal distributed variables and any multicollinearity
problems. The level of Pearson's correlation is similar to Spearman's
one, indicating that all our variables do not appear to have any serious
abnormal distributions. In addition, the levels of correlation among all
variables are quite low, implying that there are no serious
multicollinearity problems. Overall, the findings indicate that all our
variables seem to be suitable for OLS regression.
6.2 | Multiple regression analyses
6.2.1 | The influence of corporate governance on
environmental performance
Table 6 reports the results of the influence of CG on ENVIP. Specifi-
cally, Models 1 to 4 report the impact of each CG mechanism on
ENVIP, while Model 5 shows the influence of the combination of all
CG variables on providing environmental information. Model 6 pre-
sents the results of the full model.
First, Models 1, 5 and 6 show evidence of significant and positive
relationship between BSIZE and ENVIP, implying that hypothesis 1 is
empirically supported. Our results indicate that the larger the board
size, the better the environmental performance is. The positive influ-
ence of BSIZE on ENVIP is also in line with prior studies (De Villiers
et al., 2011; Post et al., 2015; Walls et al., 2012; Zou et al., 2019) and
theoretical predictions that larger boards provide more information on
environmental performance in order to gain crucial resources based
on a good connection with powerful stakeholders (Goodstein
et al., 1994). Our findings indicate that board of directors in China
have a concern for not only corporate social responsibility
(McGuinness et al., 2017), but also environmental performance. Our
results show evidence to suggest that Chinese heavily polluting com-
panies with larger boards tend to disclose more environmental perfor-
mance information compared with their smaller counterparts.
TABLE 5 Correlation matrix
ENVIP BSIZE BINDE BMEET GDIVE FIRMP FSIZE FLEVE
ENVIP 0.298* −0.004 0.336* −0.102 −0.116 0.575* 0.387*
BSIZE 0.281* −0.358* 0.042 −0.205* −0.058 0.317* 0.290*
BINDE −0.030 −0.420* 0.041 0.103 0.033 0.093 −0.097
BMEET 0.301* 0.006 0.022 −0.013 0.024 0.156** 0.132***
GDIVE −0.095 −0.150** 0.109 −0.006 0.072 −0.218* −0.074
FIRMP −0.019 −0.055 0.048 0.021 0.071 −0.092 −0.452*
FSIZE 0.542* 0.306* 0.020 0.172* −0.214* −0.062 0.500*
FLEVE 0.361* 0.284* −0.140** 0.108 −0.058 −0.281* 0.442*
Note: The bottom left half of the table reports Pearson's parametric correlation coefficients, while the upper right half of the table presents Spearman's
nonparametric correlation coefficients. Variables are defined as follows: ENVIP (ENVIP); Board Size (BSIZE), Board Independence (BINDE), Board Meeting
(BMEET), Gender Diversity (GDIVE), Firm Size (FSIZE), Firm Leverage (FLEVE) and Financial Performance (FIRMP).
*Significant at 1% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
***Significant at 10% level (Sidak-adjusted significance level).
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Second, Models 2 and 6 report the insignificant effect of BINDE
on ENVIP, whereas Model 5 shows evidence of significant and posi-
tive relationship between BINDE and ENVIP, indicating that hypothe-
sis 2 is partly supported. Our results indicate that the presence or
absence of independent directors on corporate boards has not chan-
ged corporate environmental performance. The insignificant impact of
BINDE on ENVIP are inconsistent with those of previous studies
(Fernandes et al., 2019; Iatridis, 2013; Ibrahim & Hanefah, 2016) and
theoretical predictions that independent directors put high pressure
on disclosing environmental performance. The insignificant relation-
ship can be explained by several reasons. The first reason is related
to the capacity and perspective of outside directors. Combining with
the findings of McGuinness et al. (2017), it seems that independent
directors in China are unable to evaluate their importance and put
pressure on managers to provide information on corporate social
responsibility and environmental performance. Second, similar to the
findings of previous studies in the context of developing countries
(Alnabsha et al., 2018; Sartawi, Hindawi, Bsoul, & Ali, A. e. J., 2014),
nonexecutive directors in China may not be truly independent
because they have strong connection with executive directors, which
may affect their independence. Third, independent directors may
have less influence on corporate managers, since the cost of solving
environmental issues may be higher than transaction cost of disclos-
ing environmental information (Galbreath, 2011). Finally, outside
directors appear to have weak voice to compel companies to dis-
close environmental performance because of their relatively low
presence on corporate boards in our sample of firms investigated.
Our findings suggest that instituting a training programme for direc-
tors in order to improve their skills will be a step in the right
direction.
Third, Models 3, 5 and 6 show that BMEET positively relates to
ENVIP at 1% level, indicating that hypothesis 3 is strongly supported.
Our findings indicate that firms with regular board meetings tend to
have better environmental performance. The positive impact of
BMEET on ENVIP further supports the findings of prior studies
(Jizi et al., 2014) and theoretical predictions that frequency of board
meetings create good opportunities for board of directors to share
ideas, work effectively to address multiple stakeholders' concerns on
environment. Our results show evidence that directors in Chinese
heavily polluting companies tend to focus on discussing environmen-
tal issues at board meetings.
Finally, Model 4 reports a significant and negative link between
GDIVE and ENVIP, whilst both Models 5 and 6 show evidence of insig-
nificant influence of GDIVE on ENVIP, illustrating that hypothesis 4 is
rejected. These findings indicate that the increase in transaction cost of
unethical behaviour (i.e., not providing environment performance) is
less than the cost of solving environmental issues caused by companies
(Galbreath, 2011). Hence, women directors are willing to not disclose
more information on environmental performance in order to protect
shareholder returns. Additionally, our results indicate that women
directors have no power to affect corporate environmental perfor-
mance. The insignificant relationship between GDIVE and ENVIP is con-
trary to previous studies (Elmagrhi et al., 2019) and theoretical
predictions that women directors can help increase disclosures relating
TABLE 6 The influence of corporate governance on environmental performance
Dep. variable ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP
(model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables (corporate governance):
BSIZE 0.171 (0.000)* 0.189 (0.000)* 0.079 (0.002)*
BINDE −0.077 (0.517) 0.277 (0.020)** 0.077 (0.474)
BMEET 0.111 (0.000)* 0.107 (0.000)* 0.080 (0.000)*




No of obs. 500 500 500 500 500 500
No of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 (%) 8.44 0.25 9.36 1.11 18.48 37.04
F-test 9.11 0.25 10.21 1.11 13.91 28.76
p-value 0.000 0.941 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.000
Mean VIF 1.49 1.48 1.49 1.48 1.38 1.42
Max VIF 1.61 1.60 1.62 1.61 1.65 1.66
Note: Variables are defined as follows: ENVIP (ENVIP); Board Size (BSIZE), Board Independence (BINDE), Board Meeting (BMEET), Gender Diversity
(GDIVE), Firm Size (FSIZE) and Firm Leverage (FLEVE). p-value is in parentheses
*Correlation is significant at 1% level.
**Correlation is significant at 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at 10% level.
NGUYEN ET AL. 11
to environmental performance because they tend to be more con-
cerned about environmental issues compared with male directors. The
insignificant impact of board gender diversity on environmental perfor-
mance can be explained by some factors. First, the presence of women
directors in Chinese heavily polluting companies is extremely low (less
than 10%) by comparison with other sectors (Elmagrhi et al., 2019;
McGuinness et al., 2017). Second, similar to the case in Italy (Cucari
et al., 2018), Chinese women directors are appointed by regulatory
pressures rather than necessarily based on their good expertise.
6.2.2 | The moderating role of corporate
governance on the link between financial performance
and environmental performance
Table 7 reports the findings of the moderating role of corporate
governance on the link between financial and environmental perfor-
mance. Specifically, Model 1 displays the link between FIRMP and
ENVIP, whereas Model 2 reports the impact of four corporate
governance indicators and FIRMP on ENVIP. Model 3 shows the
results of the full model.
According to Table 7, FIRMP affects ENVIP insignificantly and
negatively. Our findings show that there is no relationship between
financial performance and environmental performance. The insignifi-
cant relationship between FIRMP and ENVIP is in line with the results
of previous studies (Ahmad et al., 2015; Alnabsha et al., 2018;
Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Qiu et al., 2016; Walls et al., 2012),
indicating that the trade-off between financial performance and
environmental performance in heavily polluting industries does not
exist. Therefore, Chinese heavily polluting companies should think of
reporting more environmental performance in order to improve
financial performance. This is because they can increase their
reputation and gain the support of influential stakeholders in order to
have access to crucial resources, which can improve their financial
performance.
In addition, both Models 2 and 3 report are negative and signifi-
cant influence of BSIZE*FIRMP on ENVIP and insignificant effect of
TABLE 7 The moderating role of
corporate governance in the financial-
environmental performance nexus
Dep. Variable ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP
(model) (1) (2) (3)
Independent variable:
FIRMP −0.000 (0.647) −0.002 (0.115) −0.001 (0.363)
Corporate governance:
BSIZE 0.191 (0.000)* 0.080 (0.002)*
BINDE 0.281 (0.019)** 0.069 (0.523)
BMEET 0.108 (0.000)* 0.080 (0.000)*
GDIVE −0.086 (0.119) 0.021 (0.677)
Interaction variables:
BSIZE * FIRM −0.011 (0.042)** −0.009 (0.073)***
BINDE * FIRM −0.011 (0.654) −0.036 (0.107)
BMEET * FIRMP −0.001 (0.849) −0.001 (0.623)




No of obs. 500 500 500
No of firms 100 100 100
Year fixed effect Y Y Y
R2 (%) 0.21 19.51 37.94
F-test 0.20 9.06 19.73
p-value 0.961 0.000 0.000
Mean VIF 1.52 1.55 1.58
Max VIF 1.70 2.36 2.56
Note: Variables are defined as follows: Environmental performance (ENVIP); Board Size (BSIZE), Board
Independence (BINDE), Board Meeting (BMEET), Gender Diversity (GDIVE), Firm Size (FSIZE) and Firm
Leverage (FLEVE). The interaction variables created for firm performance and four CG proxies,
respectively. p-value is in parentheses
*Correlation is significant at 1% level.
**Correlation is significant at 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at 10% level.
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BINDE*FIRMP, BMEET*FIRMP and GDIVE*FIRMP on ENVIP. Our results
indicate that only board size can moderate the financial performance–
environmental performance nexus, while board meetings, indepen-
dence and gender diversity do not appear to have any effect on this
relationship, implying that hypothesis 5 is partly rejected. Our results
are also inconsistent with theoretical predictions that good corporate
governance practices can improve the link between financial and
environmental performance. The insignificant moderating role of
corporate governance in the financial performance–environmental
performance nexus can be explained by the weak corporate
governance practices in heavily polluting firms in China. More specifi-
cally, the presence of independent directors and female directors is
extremely low. Indeed, both women directors and independent
directors are appointed by regulatory pressures instead of being based
on their expertise.
7 | ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of re-estimating Equation 1 and 2 to
check their robustness. Specifically, this study also conducts several
additional tests, such as random effects model (REM) and fixed effects
model (FEM), which can be used to analyse panel data because they
allow us to control for unobservable variables (Camaron &
Trivedi, 2009). Furthermore, the results of this study reported under
the main analysis might be subject to potential self-selection bias if
environmental performance and the corporate governance measures
are endogenously determined. Therefore, any conclusions drawn from
these models might be misleading. Hence, to deal with any potential
endogeneity problems, this study uses a two-stage least square (2SLS)
and a dynamic system generalised method of moment (GMM) estima-
tion. Given that the focus of this study is on corporate governance
and environmental performance, this study seeks to identify good
exogenous instrumental variables (IVs) for this main variable that is
correlated with the suspected endogenous variable, but uncorrelated
with the error term of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2015).
Following the findings of previous studies (Cho & Kim, 2003), we treat
board independence (BINDE) as an endogenous variable, which is
affected by firm size (FSIZE), firm leverage (FLEVE) and 2-year lag of
board independence (BINDE). As regards Tables 8 and 9, the results of
endogeneity and over identification tests indicate that these three IVs
are valid for treating BINDE as an endogenous variable. Additionally,
in accordance with GMM model, the values of AR and Hansen tests
TABLE 8 The influence of corporate governance on environmental performance, using REM, FEM, 2SLS, and GMM
Fixed effect Random effect 2SLS GMM
Dep. variable ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP
(model) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged % ENVIP 0.279 (0.009)*
Independent variables:
BSIZE −0.037 (0.161) 0.002 (0.948) 0.053 (0.263) 0.042 (0.235)
BINDE −0.060 (0.448) −0.048 (0.535) −0.212 (0.501) 0.149 (0.356)
BMEET 0.026 (0.011)** 0.031 (0.002)* 0.069 (0.000)* 0.054 (0.001)*
GDIVE 0.084 (0.077)*** 0.066 (0.140) 0.037 (0.563) 0.038 (0.516)
Control variables:
FSIZE 0.013 (0.446) 0.061 (0.000)* 0.083 (0.000)* 0.052 (0.000)*
FLEVE 0.031 (0.257) 0.043 (0.079)*** 0.059 (0.066)*** 0.057 (0.082)***
No of obs. 500 500 300 400
No of firms 100 100 100 100
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y
R2 (%) 14.60 34.76 32.89
F-test p-value 0.015
Wald 2 test p-value 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity (p-value) 0.072
Over identification (p-value) 0.015
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.628
Hansen test p-value 0.210
Note: Variables are defined as follows: Environmental performance (ENVIP), Board Size (BSIZE), Board Independence (BINDE), Board Meeting (BMEET),
Gender Diversity (GDIVE), Firm Size (FSIZE) and Firm Leverage (FLEVE). p-value is in parentheses
*Correlation is significant at 1% level.
**Correlation is significant at 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at 10% level.
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imply that all the model specifications pass the autocorrelation test
for the validity of the instruments.
The results of all the models in Table 8 show that the frequency
of board meetings increases environmental performance, while other
CG mechanisms do not affect environmental disclosure. Similarly,
Table 9 shows that board meetings have a positive effect on
environmental performance, while other CG mechanisms do not
appear to have a link with environmental performance. Furthermore,
BSIZE*FIRMP and BINDE*FIRMP affect ENVIP negatively and
significantly, illustrating that board of directors and independent
directors decrease the financial performance–environmental
performance nexus. By contrast, BMEET*FIRM and GDIVE*FIRMP do
not influence ENVIP, implying that board meetings and women
directors have no significant effect on the relationship between
financial performance and environmental performance. Results in
Table 9 also indicate no evidence on financial performance–
environmental performance nexus. All the findings of Table 9 illustrate
that corporate governance does not play a major moderating role
in the financial performance–environmental performance nexus.
The results of Tables 8 and 9 are similar to those reported in
Tables 6 and 7.
To sum up, the findings of all these additional analyses make us
fairly confident that our results do not appear to be driven by any
potential endogenous sample selection problems.
TABLE 9 The moderating role of corporate governance in the nexus between firm performance and environmental performance, using REM,
FEM, 2SLS and GMM
Fixed effect Random effect 2SLS GMM
Dep. variable ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP ENVIP
(model) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged % ENVIP 0.284 (0.003)*
Independent variable (firm performance):
FIRMP −0.000 (0.611) −0.000 (0.536) −0.001 (0.731) −0.001 (0.259)
Corporate governance:
BSIZE −0.036 (0.176) 0.003 (0.912) 0.048 (0.316) 0.050 (0.167)
BINDE −0.064 (0.412) −0.054 (0.487) −0.258 (0.421) 0.162 (0.338)
BMEET 0.026 (0.012)** 0.031 (0.002)* 0.066 (0.000)* 0.053 (0.001)*
GDIVE 0.075 (0.121) 0.057 (0.212) 0.032 (0.626) 0.020 (0.729)
Interaction variables:
BSIZE * FIRMP −0.004 (0.147) −0.005 (0.089)*** −0.009 (0.154) −0.010 (0.001)*
BINDE * FIRMP −0.027 (0.045)** −0.026 (0.056)*** −0.046 (0.135) −0.037 (0.073)***
BMEET * FIRMP 0.001 (0.325) 0.001 (0.388) −0.001 (0.808) −0.000 (0.902)
GDIVE * FIRMP −0.003 (0.544) −0.004 (0.402) 0.009 (0.327) 0.009 (0.151)
Control variables:
FSIZE 0.017 (0.318) 0.063 (0.000)* 0.082 (0.000)* 0.055 (0.001)*
FLEVE 0.024 (0.403) 0.036 (0.155) 0.070 (0.043)* 0.0480 (0.202)
No of obs. 500 500 300 400
No of firms 100 100 100 100
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y
R2 (%) 17.41 34.68 33.29
F-test p-value 0.015
Wald test p-value 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity (p-value) 0.063
Over identification (p-value) 0.009
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) 0.444
Hansen test p-value 0.263
Note: Variables are defined as follows: Environmental performance (ENVIP), Financial Performance (FIRMP), Board Size (BSIZE), Board Independence
(BINDE), Board Meeting (BMEET), Gender Diversity (GDIVE), Firm Size (FSIZE) and Firm Leverage (FLEVE). The interaction variables created for financial
performance and four corporate governance proxies, respectively. p-value is in parentheses.
*Correlation is significant at 1% level.
**Correlation is significant at 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at 10% level.
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The China's environmental issues and problems have been on the
increase over the last decade, attracting the attention of the environ-
mental community and governments. As a result, the Chinese
government started environmental reforms, including introducing
environmental regulations and policies in order to address environ-
mental challenges. Despite these reforms, studies examining the
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on environmental perfor-
mance in China are rare (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; Zou et al., 2019). As a
result, we seek to examine the impact of internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms (i.e., BSIZE, BINDE, BMEET and GDIVE) on ENVIP.
Importantly, we also examine the moderating role of these corporate
governance mechanisms on the financial performance–environmental
performance nexus. This study, thus, contributes to the existing litera-
ture on business strategy and the environment in developing coun-
tries in the following ways.
First, this study contributes to existing literature on corporate
governance and environmental performance in a developing country
with high levels of environmental pollution and poor implementation
of environmental laws and regulations (Chang et al., 2015). Second,
our study examines the impact of internal corporate governance
mechanisms on environmental performance, and their moderating role
on the relationship between financial performance and environmental
performance in order to address the limitations of prior studies, which
only test the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on envi-
ronmental performance in China (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; McGuinness
et al., 2017). Third, this study contributes to the existing literature by
only analysing data relating to Chinese firms operating in heavily pol-
luting industries—the main source of environmental concerns and
issues (i.e., air and water pollution). Fourth, our study employs content
analysis method to develop a comprehensive environmental perfor-
mance measure covering eight dimensions, namely, clarity, environ-
mental management, environmental liabilities, environmental costs,
environmental investments, environmental performance, reliability
and system implementation in order to improve the generalisability of
the findings of prior Chinese studies. Overall, board size and the fre-
quency of board meetings have a positive effect on environmental
performance, whilst board independence and board gender diversity
do not have a significant effect on environmental performance.
Finally, this study also contributes to extant literature by relying on
different perspectives (e.g., agency, resource dependence, stake-
holder, and legitimacies theories) to explain the relationship between
CG and environmental performance.
Our results have important implications for policymakers and regu-
lators. For instance, environmental performance appears to differ
among our sampled firms and is generally low when compared with
reported performance even in other developing countries. Therefore,
policymakers and regulators, such as the Chinese government and the
stock markets, can endeavour to provide clear guidance on how best to
disclose environmental performance that can lead to improved envi-
ronmental performance disclosures. Furthermore, although Chinese
heavily polluting companies seem to comply with CG codes, their level
of environmental performance disclosure does not appear to be high,
indicating that CG practices in firms require further improvement. Con-
sequently, policymakers and regulators should endeavour to encourage
companies to comply fully with CG codes by providing clear guidelines
and enhancing enforcement actions, including a creating compliance
and enforcement committee to specifically monitor the levels of com-
pliance among firms. In addition, regulators should provide clear guid-
ance on how to improve capacity of directors and to select expert
directors and, in particular, independent or women directors.
This study has several limitations, including (i) using a relatively
small sample size, (ii) covering a comparatively short-time period,
(iii) applying a simple measure of ENVIP, (iv) focusing on a single coun-
try, (v) inability to use alternative financial performance measures
(i.e., ROE, ROIC) and (vi) using limited number of control variables
(i.e., ownership structures, executive pay). Therefore, future research
may develop their insights further by using a bigger sample size, a lon-
ger time period, multiple measures of ENVIP, a sample from multiple
countries, using alternative financial performance (i.e., ROE, ROIC) and
increased number of control variables (executive pay, environmental
management practices, ownership). Furthermore, our study examines
four CG mechanisms. Thus, future research may improve upon our
study by employing a larger number of CG mechanisms. Additionally,
this study relied on agency, resource dependence, legitimacy and stake-
holder perspectives to predict the impact of CG on environmental per-
formance. Hence, future research may rely on other perspectives, such
as upper echelon and neo-institutional theories in testing the relation-
ship between corporate governance and environmental performance.
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